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Abstract
Deep neural networks are known to be fragile to small adversarial perturbations.
This issue becomes more critical when a neural network is interconnected with
a physical system in a closed loop. In this paper, we show how to combine
recent works on neural network certification tools (which are mainly used in static
settings such as image classification) with robust control theory to certify a neural
network policy in a control loop. Specifically, we give a sufficient condition and an
algorithm to ensure that the closed loop state and control constraints are satisfied
when the persistent adversarial perturbation is `∞ norm bounded. Our method is
based on finding a positively invariant set of the closed loop dynamical system,
and thus we do not require the differentiability or the continuity of the neural
network policy. Along with the verification result, we also develop an effective
attack strategy for neural network control systems that outperforms exhaustive
Monte-Carlo search significantly. We show that our certification algorithm works
well on learned models and achieves 5 times better result than the traditional
Lipschitz-based method to certify the robustness of a neural network policy on a
cart pole control problem.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) have become state-of-the-arts in a variety of machine learning tasks,
including control of a physical system in the reinforcement learning setting. For example, in guided
policy search [1], a neural network policy is used to replace the online model predictive control policy
to directly control a physical system in a feedback loop. Yet, recent studies demonstrate that neural
networks are surprisingly fragile - the neural network policies [2], neural network classifiers [3] and
many other tasks [4, 5, 6] are all vulnerable to adversarial examples and attacks. For applications that
are safety-critical, such as self-driving cars, the existence of adversarial examples in neural networks
has raised severe and unprecedented concerns due to recent popularity on deploying neural network
based policies in various physical systems. A small perturbation on the input of the neural network
may cause significant change in control actions, which could possibly destabilize the system or drive
the system state to an unsafe region. Therefore, it is crucial to develop a verification tool that can
provide useful certificate (such as safety or robustness guarantees) for a dynamical system with a
neural network policy in the loop.
Recently, much research effort has been devoted to developing verification methods to quantify the
robustness of neural networks against adversarial input perturbations. The key idea is to characterize
the set of neural network output when the adversarial perturbations are constrained in a given set,
usually a weighted `p ball. Current mainstream verification methods can be categorized to exact
verifiers [7] and inexact verifiers [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] based on the characterization of output reachable
set being exact or over-approximated. Exact verifiers are hard to scale to large and deep neural
networks due to its intrinsic NP-completeness [7]; hence often inexact verifiers are more favorable in
real neural network applications due to their scalability and capability to deliver non-trivial robustness
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certificate efficiently. Nevertheless, all the above verifiers are developed in a static setting, specifically
for neural network classifiers, where the neural networks do not interact with a dynamical system. As
neural network policies are deployed in many real-world systems [1, 14], it is necessary to extend
the static neural network certification tool to a dynamic setting, so one can certify a neural network
policy in a feedback control loop.
In this paper, we propose a novel framework to verify neural network policies in a closed loop system
by combining the aforementioned static neural network certification tools with robust control theory.
We consider a realistic and strong threat model where the adversaries can manipulate observations
and states at every time step over an infinite horizon (hence the so-called persistent perturbations).
Our key idea is to leverage the static neural network certification tools to give a tight input-output
characterization of the neural network policy, that when combine with robust control theory, allow
us to find a positively invariant set of the closed loop dynamical system. Our contributions are
summarized as below.
Contributions.
• To our best knowledge, our work is the first one to extend the neural network certification tools [7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] to a dynamic setting, in which we certify a neural network policy in a feedback
control loop under persistent adversarial perturbation.
• Our framework can handle non-Lipschitz and discontinuous neural network policies, while the
traditional Lipschitz-based robust control approach cannot. Even when the neural network policy
is Lipschitz continuous, we prove theoretically and validate experimentally that our proposed
framework is always better than the traditional Lipschitz-based robust control approach in terms of
tighter certification bound.
• We demonstrate that our method works well on situations where the system dynamic is unknown,
unstable, and nonlinear. As long as one can learn the model and over-approximate the modeling
error using a data driven approach, our certification algorithm can be applied.
• Along with the certification algorithm, we develop an effective persistent `∞ attack algorithm that
can successfully discover the vulnerability of a neural network control system and show that such
vulnerability cannot be found by exhaustive Monte-Carlo simulation. This observation indicates
that the robustness of a neural network control system cannot be certified via exhaustive simulation,
and the mathematical-based certification framework developed in this paper is necessary.
Outline. We organize the paper as follows. We summarize related works and notations by the end
of this section, and then describe problem setting and formulations in Section 2. We present our main
theorems and algorithms in Sections 3 and 4, where we propose an algorithm to find a certificate to
ensure that the closed loop state and control constraints are satisfied when the persistent adversarial
attack signal is `∞ norm bounded. In Section 5, we conduct a comprehensive case study and show
that our proposed algorithms not only deliver much stronger certificates than traditional robust control
approaches but also work well on both learned models and non-Lipschitz neural network policies.
Related works. Our work is closely related to the neural network certification tools mentioned
above. Specifically, given a neural network policy u = pi(y), these tools can certify that u = pi(y) ∈
U for all y ∈ Y for some sets U and Y . We extend these tools to a dynamic setting where the
neural network output u can affect the neural network input y in the future via a feedback loop.
Another closely related field is safe reinforcement learning [15, 16], where the safety during policy
exploration and deployment are investigated. Recent works in [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] can further give
a certificate of stability or safety properties of a neural network control system. Our work differs
from the above works in two aspects. First, we explicitly incorporate the adversarial perturbation
in our formulation, especially the persistent perturbation sequence with bounded `∞ norm (the
`2 norm and the energy of the signal are unbounded). The Lyapunov based method [18] and the
hybrid system method [21] do not deal with perturbation and the integral quadratic constraint based
method [19, 20] is developed with bounded `2 norm on the perturbation. The second difference
is that our method does not require Lipschitz continuity on the neural network policy, a common
assumption in most of the literature. Therefore, our method can be applied on neural networks that
are discontinuous or non-differentiable in nature – due to quantization, digitalization, switching
logic, obfuscated gradient [22], or other defense strategies. Even when the neural network policy
is Lipschitz continuous, we prove theoretically and validate experimentally that our method can
2
give a tighter bound than the Lipschitz-based robust control method. Another relevant work is the
reachability analysis of a neural network control system over a finite time horizon [23]. In this paper,
we derive safety guarantee over an infinite time horizon with tighter bounds.
Notations. We use lower case letters such as x to denote vectors and upper case letters such as A
to denote matrices. We use x  y to denote that x is element-wisely less than or equal to y. For a
square matrix A, we use ρ(A) to denote its spectral radius, which is the largest absolute value of the
eigenvalues of A. We use boldface letters such as x and Φ to denote signals and transfer matrices in
the frequency domain, respectively. Consider a time series signal {x[t]}∞t=0, the unilateral z-transform
of the time series {x[t]}∞t=0 is given by x(z) =
∑∞
t=0 z
−tx[t]. We use Φ[t] to denote the t-th spectral
component of a transfer matrix Φ, i.e., Φ(z) =
∑∞
t=0 z
−tΦ[t]. We use x and Φ as shorthand of
x(z) and Φ(z) when the context makes it clear. For a frequency domain equation y = Φx, the
corresponding time domain equation is given by the convolution formula y[t] =
∑∞
τ=0 Φ[τ ]x[t− τ ].
We use ‖x‖`p to denote the standard `p norm of the signal x and use ‖Φ‖L1 and ‖Φ‖H∞ to denote
the L1 norm [24] and theH∞ norm [25] of the system Φ. We define the absolute operator abs(·) of
a stable transfer matrix Φ by abs(Φ) =
∑∞
t=0 |Φ[t]|. Note that each element of the transfer matrix Φ
is absolutely summable if and only if the transfer matrix Φ is real rational and stable (see Page 113 -
114 of [26]).
2 Problem Formulation
𝜋𝜋
𝛼𝛼
Neural Network Policy
Model Uncertainty
Figure 1: A neural network policy interconnected with an uncertain dynamical system.
We consider a neural network policy interconnected with a dynamical system. The model architecture
is shown in Figure 1, where pi(·) is the neural network control policy, P is the plant to be controlled,
and ∆ characterizes the uncertainty of the model P. When the model dynamics is unknown in
the first place, one can use data driven approaches such as [27, 28] to learn the nominal model P
and over-approximate the modeling error using ∆. We assume that P is a discrete time linear time
invariant (LTI) system with dynamics given by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] +Bww[t] +Bδδ[t] (1)
y[t] = Cx[t] +Dww[t] (2)
α[t] = Cαx[t] +Dαuu[t] +Dαww[t]. (3)
where t denotes the time index, x the state vector, u the control action, y the measurement, w the
external perturbation, and α and δ the input and output of the uncertainty block ∆. In particular, w
is a persistent perturbation over an infinite horizon t ≥ 0. In the rest of the paper, we assume zero
initial condition unless stated otherwise:
x[0] = 0. (4)
This is to simplify the presentation – the method proposed in this paper can be readily extended to
handle persistent perturbation with nonzero initial condition as well. We assume the pair (A,B) is
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stabilizable and (A,C) is detectable. The neural network policy is described by
u[t] = pi(y[t]), (5)
which is assumed to be a static policy in this paper. The uncertainty block can be dynamic, with
δ = ∆(α) (6)
in the frequency domain. We assume that ∆ is stable and norm bounded. Equations (1) - (6) give a
complete description of the model architecture shown in Figure 1.
Remark. If the input to the neural network policy is a finite horizon of historical measurement, i.e.,
u[t] = pi(y[t], y[t − 1], . . . , y[t − T ]) for a finite length T , then we can augment the state x and
measurement y for T steps and convert pi(·) to a static policy.
Remark. Note that y in (2) is not a direct function of u and δ, and α in (3) is not a direct function of
δ. This assumption ensures that the feedback structure in Figure 1 is well-posed because there is no
algebraic loop in the equation.
In this paper, we use w to model the persistent adversarial perturbation. We assume that w lies in the
set ‖w‖`∞ ≤ w∞, or equivalently,
w ∈ {w | |w[t]|  w∞1 = w¯, ∀t ≥ 0}. (7)
The matrices Bw and Dw in (1) - (2) control the impact of w on the state x and the neural network
input y. We note that the block ∆ can be used to model another type of adversarial perturbation,
such as changing the physical parameters of the model. The goal of this paper is the following:
Goal. Given the model equations (1) - (6), design an algorithm to certify that the following require-
ment is satisfied for any adversarial sequence {w[t]}∞t=0 satisfying (7):
|x[t]|  xlim, |y[t]|  ylim, |u[t]|  ulim, ∀t ≥ 0. (8)
3 Closed Loop Boundedness
In this section, we derive a sufficient condition to ensure that the state x, measurement y, and control
u in Figure 1 are bounded for any adversarial attack w lies within the `∞ ball (7). In Section 3.1,
we assume that the plant model (1) - (3) is open loop stable, i.e., ρ(A) < 1, and directly apply
traditional robust control theory to obtain Lemma 1 for closed loop stability. We then explain the
restrictions of Lemma 1 and improve the results by combining robust control theory with neural
network certification tools to obtain Theorem 1 in Section 3.2. Finally, we extend our results to
unstable plants in Section 3.3.
3.1 Stable Plant: robust control baseline
With the zero initial condition assumption, we can use the frequency domain notation introduced
before to rewrite (1) - (3) as
x = Φxuu + Φxww + Φxδδ (9a)
y = Φyuu + Φyww + Φyδδ (9b)
α = Φαuu + Φαww + Φαδδ. (9c)
with Φxu = (zI−A)−1B, Φxw = (zI−A)−1Bw, Φxδ = (zI−A)−1Bδ , Φyu = C(zI−A)−1B,
Φyw = C(zI − A)−1Bw + Dw, Φyδ = C(zI − A)−1Bδ, Φαu = Cα(zI − A)−1B + Dαu,
Φαw = Cα(zI −A)−1Bw +Dαw, and Φαδ = Cα(zI −A)−1Bδ .
To show the input-output stability1 of the structure in Figure 1, we first assume that the neural network
policy is locally Lipschitz continuous with a finite `∞ to `∞ gain γpi, i.e., ‖u‖`∞ ≤ γpi‖y‖`∞ over
some range ‖y‖`∞ ≤ y∞. For a stable transfer matrix, the `∞ to `∞ induced norm is known as theL1 system norm [24], which is defined by
‖G‖L1 = max
i
n∑
j=1
‖gij‖1 = max
i
n∑
j=1
∞∑
t=0
|gij [t]|
1The closed loop system is said to be finite gain input-output stable if the gain from perturbation w to
(x,u,y) is finite.
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where gij is the (i, j)-th entry of the transfer matrix G and n is the number of column of G. The
following Lemma gives the local input-output stability of Figure 1, which directly comes from robust
control theory:
Lemma 1. Consider a stable LTI plant (1) - (4) interconnected with a neural network policy (5) and
a dynamic uncertainty block (6) as shown in Figure 1. Assume that the persistent perturbation w lies
in the set given by (7). Suppose that the neural network policy u = pi(y) has a finite `∞ to `∞ gain
γpi for all ‖y‖`∞ ≤ y∞, and the uncertainty block ∆ has the property ‖δ‖`∞ ≤ γ∆‖α‖`∞ . If the
following three conditions hold:
β1 = γ∆‖Φαδ‖L1 < 1 (10a)
β2 = γpi
[
‖Φyu‖L1 +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαu‖L1
]
< 1 (10b)
1
1− β2
[
‖Φyw‖L1 +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαw‖L1
]
w∞ ≤ y∞ (10c)
then the closed loop system in Figure 1 is input-output stable over the region ‖y‖`∞ ≤ y∞ for all
adversarial attack w satisfying (7).
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A. To certify the local input-output stabilit of
the closed loop system using Lemma 1, we can iteratively search for y∞ until the local Lipschitz
continuous assumption and (10a) - (10c) are both satisfied, or the state constraint is violated. Note
that when γpi is the global `∞ to `∞ bound of the neural network policy, we can drop the condition
(10c) because y∞ can be arbitrarily large. The global version of Lemma 1, i.e., with y∞ being
arbitrarily large, can be found in the robust control literature in [29]. When the magnitude of the
signals w and y is characterized by the `2 norm, we can replace the L1 norm in Lemma 1 by theH∞
norm, as the H∞ norm is equivalent to the `2 to `2 induced norm. We include the global and H∞
version of Lemma 1 as a corollary in Appendix A, which is an unstructured version of the main loop
theorem2 [30, 25] in the robust control literature (H∞ control and structured singular value).
3.2 Stable Plant: improvement
Lemma 1 has several restrictions. First, the neural network policy needs to be Lipschitz continuous,
and thus Lemma 1 cannot be applied on non-differentiable or discontinuous policies due to quanti-
zation or other issues. Second, even when the given neural network policy is Lipschitz continuous,
the bound of the local Lipschitz constant γpi for a deep neural network policy is usually very loose.
As a consequence, Lemma 1 can only be applied to certify the robustness of Figure 1 over a small
region near the stable equilibrium. Finally and most importantly, even if the given policy is Lipschitz
continuous and the local Lipschitz constant γpi is exact, using ‖u‖`∞ ≤ γpi‖y‖`∞ to characterize the
input-output relation of a given neural network is usually very loose. In this subsection, we improve
the results of Lemma 1 and propose a more useful Theorem to certify the boundedness of the structure
in Figure 1.
Our strategy is to use the static neural network certification tool to give a tighter characterization of
the input-output relation of the given neural network policy. The following Theorem gives a sufficient
condition to ensure closed loop boundedness under any adversarial attack satisfying (7).
Theorem 1. Consider a stable LTI plant (1) - (4) interconnected with a neural network policy (5)
and a dynamic uncertainty block (6) as shown in Figure 1. Assume that the persistent perturbation w
lies in the set given by (7). If we can find a quadruplet (y¯, u¯, α¯, δ¯) satisfying the following conditions:
1. Neural network policy robustness certificate: The static policy u = pi(y) has the property
|u|  u¯ for all |y|  y¯
2. Input-output relation of the uncertainty block: δ = ∆(α) has the property |α[k]|  α¯,
k = 0, · · · , t =⇒ |δ[t]|  δ¯ for all t ≥ 0.
3. Feedback condition: abs(Φyw) w¯ + abs(Φyu) u¯ + abs(Φyδ) δ¯  y¯ and abs(Φαw) w¯ +
abs(Φαu) u¯ + abs(Φαδ) δ¯  α¯
then we have the following properties:
2This can be considered as an extension of the well-known small gain theorem.
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1. Bounded feedback signals: |y[t]|  y¯, |u[t]|  u¯, |α[t]|  α¯, |δ[t]|  δ¯ for all t ≥ 0
2. Bounded state: |x[t]|  x¯, with x¯ = abs(Φxw) w¯ + abs(Φxu) u¯ + abs(Φxδ) δ¯ for all t ≥ 0
The key idea of Theorem 1 is to combine a static neural network certification algorithm [8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13] with robust control theory to certify a neural network policy in a feedback control loop.
The first condition of Theorem 1 is an input-output characterization of the neural network policy,
which can be obtained by a static neural network certification algorithm. The second condition is
a characterization of the model uncertainty block ∆. The third condition, when combining with
the first two conditions, ensures that {(y, u, α, δ)| |y|  y¯, |u|  u¯, |α|  α¯, |δ|  δ¯} is a positively
invariant set of the closed loop dynamical system. The complete proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix
A. Theorem 1 can be used as follows: if we have (x¯, y¯, u¯)  (xlim, ylim, ulim), then the requirement
(8) is satisfied. We will discuss how to find a quadruplet (y¯, u¯, α¯, δ¯) satisfying the conditions of
Theorem 1 in Section 4.
Theorem 1 has several advantages over Lemma 1. First, Theorem 1 does not require the differen-
tiability or continuity of the neural network policy pi(·). Theorem 1 is valid as long as the property
|u|  u¯ for all |y|  y¯ can be certified. This is one of the key difference between our approach and
the existing literature [17, 18, 19, 20], where the results are obtained based on the assumption of
Lipschitz continuity. Second, the neural network certification tool can give a tighter input-output
characterization of the neural network policy than the local Lipschitz constant. As a result, the
conditions of Theorem 1 are less restricted and easier to satisfy. Indeed, the following Theorem
(proof in Appendix A) claims that the conditions of Lemma 1 implies that the sufficient conditions of
Theorem 1 will always hold. This means that Theorem 1 can be applied on a strictly larger class of
problems than that of Lemma 1.
Theorem 2. The conditions of Lemma 1 imply the conditions of Theorem 1.
Note that Theorem 1 only certifies the boundedness of the closed loop system, not the stability of the
closed loop system – Theorem 1 does not guarantee that x = 0 is a stable equilibrium. However, in
the presence of persistent adversarial perturbation, we argue that there is no significant difference
between boundedness and stability because both of them will have a finite yet nonzero state deviation.
In our case study in Section 5, we show that Theorem 1 is much more useful than the traditional
robust control approach (Lemma 1) as it can certify the requirement (8) with persistent adversarial
attack (7) that is 5 times larger.
3.3 Unstable Plant
In this subsection, we consider the case where the plant (1) - (3) is unstable. Our strategy is to extract
a first order approximation of the neural network policy to stabilize the plant first, then analyze the
interconnection of the stabilized plant and the residual control policy. Specifically, we rewrite the
neural network policy as u[t] = pi(y[t]) = K0y[t] + pi0(y[t]) for some matrix K0. We call pi0(·) the
residual control policy. Equations (1) - (3) then become
x[t+ 1] = (A+BK0C)x[t] +Bu0[t] + (BK0Dw +Bw)w[t] +Bδδ[t] (11a)
y[t] = Cx[t] +Dww[t] (11b)
α[t] = (Cα +DαuK0C)x[t] +Dαuu0[t] + (DαuK0Dw +Dαw)w[t] (11c)
with the neural network policy u0[t] = pi0(y[t]). As long as the spectral radius of the closed loop
system matrixAcl = (A+BK0C) is less than 1, the transfer matrix (zI−Acl)−1 is stable. Theorem
1 can then be used with redefined transfer matrices: for instance, we have Φxu = (zI −Acl)−1B,
Φxw = (zI − Acl)−1(BK0Dw + Bw), and Φxδ = (zI − Acl)−1Bδ. Other transfer matrices can
be derived in a similar manner. In the following, we propose two different ways to obtain a candidate
K0: (1) using the Jacobian evaluated at the origin, and (2) using neural network certification tool to
find a first order approximation of the policy over a region.
If the neural network policy has the property pi(0) = 0 and is differentiable at y = 0, we can use the
Jacobian of pi(y) evaluated at y = 0 as a candidate for K0, i.e., K0 =
∂pi(y)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=0
. In this case, the
residual control policy pi0(y) has the following property:
pi0(0) = 0 and limit‖y‖→0
‖pi0(y)‖
‖y‖ → 0 (12)
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We then have the following Lemma adopt from Theorem 4.3 in [31] (uncertainty ∆ is ignored).
Lemma 2 (Local stability). Consider the dynamical system (11a) - (11b) with the residual control
policy pi0(y) = pi(y) − K0y satisfying (12). If ρ(A + BK0C) < 1, then x = 0 is a locally
asymptotically stable equilibrium point of the system (11a) - (11c). On the other hand, if ρ(A +
BK0C) > 1, then x = 0 is a locally unstable equilibrium point of the system (11a) - (11c).
If the neural network policy is not differentiable or the equilibrium x = 0 is locally unstable according
to Lemma 2, one can leverage the neural network certification tools to find a different candidate K0.
For instance, the method proposed in [9] provide a pair of linear lower and upper bounds on the
neural network output as
KLy + bL ≤ pi(y) ≤ KUy + bU , ∀|y|  yref . (13)
A candidate K0 is given by (KU +KL)/2, which is a first order approximation of the control policy
over the region |y|  yref . As long as we can find a K0 to make ρ(Acl) < 1, Theorem 1 is a valid
sufficient condition to verify the requirement (8) under persistent adversarial perturbation (7). This
statement holds even when a stable equilibrium does not exist.
4 Algorithms
In this section, we propose an iterative algorithm (Algorithm 1) to find a quadruplet (y¯, u¯0, α¯, δ¯) that
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1. We then propose a simple and effective attack strategy for a
neural network control system.
4.1 Algorithm for Theorem 1
For an unstable plant, we assume that a matrix Kd with ρ(A + BKdC) < 1 is given as a default
linear approximation of the neural network policy3. We assume that the uncertainty block is described
by |δ|  Γ∆|α| for a non-negative matrix Γ∆. We explain why this form of uncertainty is natural
when the model and uncertainty are learned using a data driven approach in [27] in Appendix B. The
following algorithm finds a quadruplet (y¯, u¯0, α¯, δ¯) satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1 Certification of state and control constraints under persistent adversarial perturbation
1: Input: Equations (1) - (8), initial bounds yref = 0 and αref = 0, default approximation Kd,
parameter  = 10−6, flag Success = False, Done = False, k = 0, MaxIter = 200
2: Output: flag Success, certified bounds x¯, y¯, u¯
3: while Done == False and k < MaxIter do
4: u¯0, u¯, K = NN-CERTIFICATION(pi, yref , Kd) from existing tools such as (13)
5: δ¯ = Γ∆ αref
6: Calculate the transfer matrices Φxu, Φxw, Φxδ , Φyu, Φyw, Φyδ , Φαu, Φαw, Φαδ .
7:
[
x¯
y¯
α¯
]
= abs
([Φxw Φxu Φxδ
Φyw Φyu Φyδ
Φαw Φαu Φαδ
])  w¯u¯0
δ¯

8: if x¯ 6 xlim or y¯ 6 ylim or u¯ 6 ulim then
9: Success = False, Done = True
10: else if y¯  yref and α¯  αref then
11: Success = True, Done = True
12: else
13: yref = (1 + )y¯, αref = (1 + )α¯, k = k + 1
14: end if
15: end while
16: Return Success, x¯, y¯, u¯
3We note that finding a static gain K to make (A + BKC) a stable matrix is known as the static output
feedback problem in the control literature. In the worst case, this problem can be NP-hard [32]. For an output
feedback problem, one may consider using a dynamic (recurrent) policy for control, but that is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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Algorithm 1 can be interpreted as follows. We first extract a linear policy K to make the closed
loop transfer matrices stable and calculate the bounds for u¯ and u¯0 over the region |y|  yref
using any neural network certification tool. Meanwhile, we calculate the bound for δ based on the
assumption of the uncertainty block ∆. These two steps ensure that the quadruplet (yref , u¯0, αref , δ¯)
satisfies the first two conditions of Theorem 1. Given the range of the adversarial perturbation w¯, the
residual control action u¯0, and the uncertainty-induced input δ¯, we calculate the bounds for the state
x, measurement y, and α on Line 7. If we have y¯  yref and α¯  αref , then (yref , u¯0, αref , δ¯) also
satisfies the third condition of Theorem 1, thus we obtain a certificate for closed loop boundedness. If
y¯ 6 yref or α¯ 6 αref , we then increase the test bound (yref , αref ) and repeat the search.
4.2 Attack Algorithm
In addition to the certification algorithm, here we propose an algorithm to attack the neural network
policy in the control loop. As an example, we show how to design a perturbation sequence {w[t]}Tt=0
with ‖w‖`∞ = 1 to attack the i-th state xi. Our idea is to follow Lines 4 - 6 of Algorithm 1 to
construct the closed loop transfer matrices with the help of neural network certification tools. We
then have
x[T ] =
T∑
τ=0
Φxw[T − τ ]w[τ ] + Φxu[T − τ ]u0[τ ] + Φxδ[T − τ ]δ[τ ].
If we ignore the contribution of u0 and δ, we can maximize xi[T ] using the following `∞ bounded
perturbation sequence:
wj [t] = sign((Φxw[T − t])ij), t = 0, · · · , T (14)
for each j. Note that (14) is sub-optimal because we ignore the contribution of u0 and δ. Nevertheless,
we show in the next section that our attack (14) is extremely strong.
5 Case Study
In this section, we demonstrate our algorithm on a cart-pole example and show the following results:
(i) Our proposed framework (Theorem 1 and Algorithm 1) outperforms methods based on
traditional robust control theory (Lemma 1). Specifically, Algorithm 1 can certify the
boundedness of the closed loop system with attack level that is 5 times larger than that of a
robust control approach. See the result in Figure 2a.
(ii) Our proposed attack algorithm (14) is far more effective than an exhuastive Monte-Carlo
attack. In particular, our model-based attack algorithm can successfully discover the internal
vulnerability of the closed loop system while an exhaustive Monte-Carlo simulation cannot.
See the result in Figures 2b, 3a, and 3b.
(iii) We show that Algorithm 1 works well on situations where the system dynamics is unknown,
unstable, and nonlinear. We use the technique in [27] to learn a nominal plant model P
with conservative over-approximation of the modeling error ∆, then use Algorithm 1 to
certify the robustness of the neural network policy interconnected with the learned model.
The result is close to that with the knowledge of the true model. See the result in Figure 4a.
(iv) We show that Algorithm 1 can be applied on a discontinuous and non-Lipschitz neural
network policy, where the control action is quantized into discrete levels. Lipschitz-based
methods [17, 18, 19, 20] cannot be used to certify the boundedness of a closed loop system
in this case. See the result in Figure 4b.
Experiment setup. We use proximal policy optimization [33] in stable baselines [34] to train a
3-layer neural network policy for the cart-pole problem in Open-AI gym [35]. Our neural network
has 16 neurons per hidden layer, ReLU activations, and continuous control output. We note that many
trained neural network policies can obtain perfect reward in the training environment over a finite
horizon, but will eventually become unstable if we simulate the closed loop dynamics over a longer
time horizon. To obtain a more stable policy, we modify the reward function to be
r[t] = 2− x[t]
>Qx[t] + u[t]>Ru[t]
x>limQxlim + u
>
limRulim
,
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Figure 2: Experiment I: Compare our methods with traditional approaches. (a): The safe region
certified by our Algorithm 1 (area below the blue curve) is larger than the safe region certified by
the traditional robust control approach (Lemma 1, area below the red curve). (b): The unsafe region
discovered by our attack algorithm (14) (area above the black curve) is much larger than the unsafe
region discovered by exhaustive Monte-Carlo simulation (area above the brown curve).
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(a) Algorithm 1 can be 5.3× better than the robust
control approach.
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(b) Our attack (14) is far more effective than the ex-
haustive Monte-Carlo simulation.
which will attempt to minimize the quadratic cost x[t]>Qx[t] + u[t]>Ru[t]. The policy is trained
with 2M steps. We use the neural network certification framework recently developed in [9, 12, 36]
but any other neural network certification tools such as [7, 10, 11] can be used in Algorithm 1 as
well. The stronger the neural network certification algorithm, the stronger the robustness certificate
delivered by Algorithm 1.
For the ease of illustrating the result, we consider an one dimensional persistent perturbation on the
pole angle measurement of the cart-pole. The requirement is to certify that a single state (angle of
the pole) is within the user-specified limit. Note that Algorithm 1 can be applied to systems with
multi-dimensional perturbations with user-specified requirement on both state, measurement, and
control action. In the following experiments, we use attack level w∞ to represent the `∞ norm of the
perturbation on pole angle measurement, and use state deviation limit xlim to represent the limit on
the `∞ norm of the pole angle state. Both the attack level and the state deviation are normalized with
respect to 0.014 degree, which is the maximum attack level that can be certified by the Lipschitz-based
robust control approach (Lemma 1). The complete model equations are in Appendix B.
5.1 Experiment I: Compare with traditional robust control certification and Monte-Carlo
based attacks
Tightness of Algorithm 1. In this experiment, we use the linearized cart-pole model with no
uncertainty (Γ∆ = 0) to compare the tightness of Algorithm 1 (Theorem 1) and the Lipschitz-
based robust control baseline (Lemma 1). Given a user-specified state deviation limit xlim, we use
binary search to call Algorithm 1 repeatedly to obtain the largest possible w∗∞ such that the safety
requirement ‖x‖`∞ ≤ xlim is satisfied for any persistent attack ‖w‖`∞ ≤ w∗∞. We plot w∗∞ as a
function of xlim as the blue curve in Figure 2a. Clearly, the area below the blue curve is the safe
region certified by Theorem 1. Likewise, the area below the red curve is the safe region certified by
the traditional robust control theory (Lemma 1), where the local Lipschitz constant is obtained via a
sampling-based approach4. Figure 2a validates our claim in Theorem 2 – the safe region certified by
4We note that several recent works [37] have proposed algorithms to calculate the Lipschitz constant of a
neural network policy. However, since cart-pole is an unstable system, we need to use the technique described in
Section 3.3 and the Lipschitz constant we need is the local Lipschitz constant of the residual neural network
policy u0 = pi0(y) = pi(y)−K0y. We are not aware of any work that can give us a tight bound in this case,
thus we use sampling-based approach to obtain a lower bound of the local Lipschitz constant. Strictly speaking,
since it is only a lower bound, Lemma 1 does not offer a safety certificate. Even though the comparison is in
favor of the robust control baseline, we still show that our Algorithm 1 outperforms the robust control baseline
with a huge margin.
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Figure 3: Comparison between our designed attack with Monte-Carlo based attack. (a): Our designed
attack is injected between 100s and 150s. Monte-Carlo based random attack is injected before
100s and after 150s. (b): Our designed attack causes a huge state deviation between 100s and 150s
compared to the Monte-Carlo based attack.
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(b) State deviation as the output
Lemma 1 is always a subset of the safe region certified by Theorem 1. For xlim = 50 (the vertical
green line in Figure 2a), Algorithm 1 can certify an attack level that is 5.3 times larger than the
one using Lemma 1. Note that there is a flat dashed line at attack level = 1 for the robust control
approach. This is because when the attack level is greater than 1, the conditions (10a) - (10c) of
Lemma 1 no longer hold. In other words, the maximum attack level that can be certified by Lemma 1
is 1 regardless of the state deviation limit.
Note that in this experiment, the local Lipschitz constant used in Lemma 1 is only a lower bound
because it is obtained via a sampling-based approach. Therefore, the only reason that can explain the
gap between the blue curve and the red curve is that the neural network certification algorithm [9]
gives a much tighter input-output characterization of the neural network policy than the Lipschitz-
based method (which uses ‖u‖`∞ ≤ γpi‖y‖`∞). Other Lipschitz-based methods also have this
limitation [17, 18, 19, 20]. In brief, our Algorithm 1 outperforms the robust control baseline and can
achieve up to 5.3 times better robustness certificate.
In Figure 2a, the area above the black curve is the unsafe region where our attack algorithm (14)
(with T = 2500) is able to make the state deviation exceed the user-specified limit. When the attack
level is small (< 1), we can see from Figure 2a that the black, blue, and red curves overlap. This
means that our certification bound is tight in this region. When the attack level increases (or the state
deviation limit increases), we start to see a gap between our certification algorithm and our attack
algorithm. Future research will attempt to further bridge this gap.
Our attack algorithm. In Figure 2b, we show that our simple attack algorithm (14) is far more
effective than an exhaustive Monte-Carlo simulation. Specifically, the area above the black curve is
the unsafe region discovered by our attack algorithm (14) (with T = 2500), while the area above the
brown curve is the unsafe region discovered by Monte-Carlo simulation with 1 million time steps.
There is a huge gap between the unsafe region found by the two methods. This is a strong evidence
that the safety of a neural network control system cannot be certified using exhaustive Monte-Carlo
simulation. We need to use the certification framework developed in this paper to guarantee the
safeness of a neural network control system.
As a concrete example, at attack level 5 (the horizontal red line in Figure 2b), the mean, standard
deviation, and maximum of the state deviation in 1 million steps Monte-Carlo simulation are 0,
1.1, and 5.2, respectively. One may conclude that the probability of seeing a state deviation greater
than 5.2 is 10−6 and falsely claim that the area below the brown region is safe. Unfortunately, this
statement is not true when the perturbation sequence is adversarial – for the same level of perturbation,
the maximum state deviation found by our algorithm is 31.4, which is 29 standard deviation away.
We show the perturbation sequence (input) and the state deviation (output) as functions of time in
Figures 3a and 3b. In Figure 3a, we inject our designed attack between 100s and 150s (sampling
time = 0.02s, and thus the number of time step is T = 2500). We inject Monte-Carlo based random
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Figure 4: Experiment II: Algorithm 1 works on learned models and non-Lipschitz neural network
policies. (a): Compare Algorithm 1 on various learned models [27] and the true model. (b) Compare
certificates on Lipschitz and non-Lipschitz (quantized) neural network policies.
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(b) Algorithm 1 works on non-Lipschitz policies.
attack with the same attack level before 100s and after 150s. It is clear from Figure 3b that the state
deviation is significantly higher when we inject our attack. Specifically, our attack algorithm can
excite the resonance of the closed loop system, while an exhaustive Monte-Carlo simulation usually
cannot. We should also note that here we only consider an one dimensional perturbation sequence.
Our algorithm (14) can be used to design a multi-dimensional perturbation. The gap between our
approach and the Monte-Carlo approach will be even larger in the multi-dimensional setting.
In summary, Figures 2a and 2b show that both our certification algorithm and attack algorithm are
significantly better than the traditional methods.
5.2 Experiment II: Certificates on learned dynamics and non-Lipschitz policies
Algorithm 1 on learned models. In many reinforcement learning applications, the mathematical
model of the system dynamics (1) - (6) is not available in the first place. Therefore, we need to learn
the model before performing the certification task. In this experiment, we show that Algorithm 1
works well on learned models – even when the underlying system dynamics is unknown, unstable,
and nonlinear.
We use the method proposed in [27] to learn the nominal model P and a conservative estimate of
the uncertainty ∆. For each episode, we run the simulation using the black-box nonlinear cart-pole
model with random control action for 30 time steps. We run N episodes of simulation to collect
the data, then we solve a regression problem to estimate the system matrices for the nominal model
P. To get a conservative bound of the modeling error ∆, we synthesize 100 bootstrap samples of
P and use the element-wise maximum deviation from the nominal model to over-approximate the
model uncertainty ∆. Empirically, there is high probability that the modeling error is bounded by ∆.
Beside the bootstrap approach, one can also use other algorithms proposed in [27] to get a stronger
mathematical guarantee on the bounds of modeling error if certain technical conditions hold. We
include a detailed description of our model learning procedure in Appendix B.
In Figure 4a, we show the certification result of Algorithm 1 on models learned with different number
of episodes N . As N increases, the 100 bootstrap samples become more consistent and thus the
size of the modeling error ∆ shrinks. For N = 100, we can see from Figure 4a that the safe region
certified by Algorithm 1 is very close to that with the true linearized model with no uncertainty. This
experiment shows that our method indeed works well even when the model of the system dynamics is
unknown in the first place. Given a nonlinear and unknown plant model interconnected with a neural
network control policy, as long as we can find a nominal LTI plant P and bound the modeling error
by ∆, we can use Algorithm 1 to certify the boundedness of the closed loop system under persistent
adversarial perturbation.
Algorithm 1 on non-Lipschitz neural network policies. In Figure 4b, we show that Algorithm
1 can be applied on a non-Lipschitz and discontinuous neural network policy. Specifically, we
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assume that the output of the neural network is quantized into discrete levels. This is a common
setting in many reinforcement learning tasks, in which the control action is chosen from a discrete
set. When the neural network output is quantized into discrete levels, the neural network policy
becomes discontinuous and the closed loop system may not have a stable equilibrium. Therefore,
the Lipschitz-based and the stability based methods [17, 18, 19, 20] cannot be used to certify the
boundedness of the closed loop system. On the other hand, our Algorithm 1 can still be applied in this
case – the area below the light blue curve in Figure 4b is the safe region certified by Algorithm 1. This
is because we use the static neural network certification tools [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] to characterize the
input-output relation of a neural network policy, which works even when the policy is not Lipschitz
continuous.
6 Conclusions and Future Works
Neural networks have shown superior performance in various control tasks in reinforcement learn-
ing [1], yet people have concerns using them in safety critical systems because it is hard to certify
its robustness under adversarial attacks. In this paper, we extended the neural network certification
tools [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] into a dynamic setting and developed an algorithm to certify the robust-
ness of a neural network policy in a feedback control loop under persistent adversarial attack. We
showed both theoretically and empirically that our method outperforms the traditional Lipschitz-based
robust control approach and works on situations where the model dynamics is unknown in the first
place. We also developed an `∞ attack algorithm and showed that it can discover the vulnerability of
a neural network control system while an exhaustive Monte-Carlo simulation cannot – this suggested
that a mathematical-based certification framework, like the one developed in this paper, is necessary
to ensure the safety of a neural network control system. The key idea of our method is combining
static neural network certification algorithms with robust control using invariant set principle. This
idea is fundamental and can be extended to more general settings in many directions. In the future, we
will further tighten the certification bound by exploring more general characterization of the invariant
set.
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Appendix A: proof of Theorems
Here we give the proofs for Lemma 1 and Theorems 1 and 2. We also introduce Corollary 1, which is
the globalH∞ version of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. We first show that (10a) - (10b) is a sufficient condition for global stability when
γpi is the global Lipschitz constant. From the assumption, we have
‖δ‖`∞ ≤ γ∆‖α‖`∞
= γ∆‖Φαuu + Φαww + Φαδδ‖`∞
≤ γ∆‖Φαδ‖L1‖δ‖`∞ + γ∆‖Φαuu + Φαww‖`∞ .
From condition (10a), we can bound the `∞ norm of δ as
‖δ‖`∞ ≤
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φαuu + Φαww‖`∞ . (16)
Then, we have
‖y‖`∞ = ‖Φyδδ + Φyuu + Φyww‖`∞ (17a)
≤ ‖Φyδ‖L1‖δ‖`∞ + ‖Φyuu + Φyww‖`∞ (17b)
≤ γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαuu + Φαww‖`∞ + ‖Φyuu + Φyww‖`∞ (17c)
≤
(
‖Φyu‖L1 +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαu‖L1
)
‖u‖`∞
+ ‖Φyww‖`∞ +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαww‖`∞ (17d)
≤ γpi
(
‖Φyu‖L1 +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαu‖L1
)
‖y‖`∞
+
(
‖Φyw‖L1 +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαw‖L1
)
‖w‖`∞ (17e)
From condition (10b), we can bound the `∞ norm of y as
‖y‖`∞ ≤
1
1− β2
(
‖Φyw‖L1 +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαw‖L1
)
‖w‖`∞ . (18)
This shows that the `∞ to `∞ gain from w to y is bounded. We can use similar procedure to show
that the `∞ to `∞ gain from w to u, δ, α are all bounded. This shows the input-output stability of
the closed loop system when the global Lipschitz constant of the neural network policy is γpi .
Next, we consider the case where γpi is valid only over a local region ‖y‖`∞ ≤ y∞. From (10c), we
know that the right-hand-side of (18) is less than or equal to y∞ given ‖w‖`∞ ≤ w∞. Thus, y will
never go outside the local region ‖y‖`∞ ≤ y∞ where we calculate the Lipschitz constant γpi for any
valid perturbation (7). This completes the proof.
The globalH∞ version of Lemma 1
The following Corollary is the globalH∞ version of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. Consider a stable LTI plant (1) - (4) interconnected with a neural network policy (5)
and a dynamic uncertainty block (6) as shown in Figure 1. Assume that the persistent perturbation
w lies in the set given by (7). Suppose that the neural network policy u = pi(y) has a finite `2 to `2
gain γpi for all y, and the uncertainty block ∆ has the property ‖δ‖`2 ≤ γ∆‖α‖`2 . If the following
conditions hold:
β1 = γ∆‖Φαδ‖H∞ < 1 (19a)
β2 = γpi
[
‖Φyu‖H∞ +
γ∆
1− β1 ‖Φyδ‖H∞‖Φαu‖H∞
]
< 1 (19b)
then the closed loop system in Figure 1 is `2 to `2 input-output stable.
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Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the concept of a positively invariant set, which is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (from [38]). A setM is said to be a positively invariant set with respect to the dynamics
x[t+ 1] = f(x[t]) if
x[0] ∈M =⇒ x[t] ∈M,∀t ≥ 0. (20)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given as follows:
Proof of Theorem 1. We use mathematical induction to show that I = {(y, u, α, δ)| |y|  y¯, |u| 
u¯, |α|  α¯, |δ|  δ¯} is a positively invariant set of the closed loop dynamical system if the three
conditions of the theorem are given. From the zero initial condition assumption in (4), we have
|y[0]| = |Dww[0]|  abs(Dw)w¯  abs(Φyw)w¯  y¯
where the last inequality is from the third condition of the theorem. Then from the first condition of
the theorem, we have |u[0]|  u¯. Similarly, we have
|α[0]| = |Dαuu[0] +Dαww[0]|  abs(Dαu)u¯+ abs(Dαw)w¯  abs(Φαu)u¯+ abs(Φαw)w¯  α¯.
Then from the second condition of the theorem, we have |δ[0]|  δ¯. This shows
(y[0], u[0], α[0], δ[0]) ∈ I. Assume that we have (y[t], u[t], α[t], δ[t]) ∈ I for all 0 ≤ t < T .
From equation (9b), we have
|y[T ]| = |
∞∑
τ=0
Φyu[τ ]u[T − τ ] + Φyw[τ ]w[T − τ ] + Φyδ[τ ]δ[T − τ ] |

∞∑
τ=0
|Φyu[τ ]u[T − τ ]|+ |Φyw[τ ]w[T − τ ]|+ |Φyδ[τ ]δ[T − τ ] |

∞∑
τ=0
|Φyu[τ ]|u¯+ |Φyw[τ ]|w¯ + |Φyδ[τ ]|δ¯
= abs(Φyu)u¯+ abs(Φyw)w¯ + abs(Φyδ)δ¯
 y¯
where the last inequality is from the third condition of the theorem. Similarly, we can derive
|α[T ]|  α¯ from (9c). The first two conditions of Theorem 1 then imply |u[T ]|  u¯ and |δ[T ]|  δ¯,
and thus we have (y[T ], u[T ], α[T ], δ[T ]) ∈ I. Using mathematical induction, we conclude that
(y[t], u[t], α[t], δ[t]) ∈ I for all t ≥ 0 and the closed loop feedback signals and state are bounded
within the set specified by the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. We need to show that when (10a) - (10c) and the locally Lipschitz continuous
assumption of Lemma 1 are satisfied, we can always construct a quadruplet (y¯, u¯, α¯, δ¯) satisfying the
three conditions of Theorem 1. Consider the following equation:[
yref
αref
]
=
1
(1− β1)(1− β2)
[
1− γ∆‖Φαδ‖L1 γ∆‖Φyδ‖L1
γpi‖Φαu‖L1 1− γpi‖Φyu‖L1
] [‖Φyw‖L1‖Φαw‖L1
]
w∞, (22)
with scalar variables yref and αref . For any w∞ > 0, we have yref > 0 and αref > 0 because all
the elements in (22) are positive according to the conditions (10a) - (10b). In addition, we can show
that yref defined in (22) is equivalent to the left-hand-side of (10c). Therefore, we have yref ≤ y∞
from (10c) – this means that yref is always contained within the region where we calculate the local
Lipschitz constant of the neural network policy γpi . It is then straightforward to verify that y¯ = yref1,
u¯ = γpiyref1, α¯ = αref1, δ¯ = γ∆αref1 satisfy the first two conditions of Theorem 1 given the
locally Lipschitz continuous assumption of Lemma 1.
For the third condition of Theorem 1, it can be verified that (22) is a solution to the following
inequality: [‖Φyw‖L1‖Φαw‖L1
]
w∞ 
[
1− γpi‖Φyu‖L1 −γ∆‖Φyδ‖L1−γpi‖Φαu‖L1 1− γ∆‖Φαδ‖L1
] [
yref
αref
]
,
16
which can be rearranged into[‖Φyw‖L1‖Φαw‖L1
]
w∞ +
[‖Φyu‖L1 ‖Φyδ‖L1‖Φαu‖L1 ‖Φαδ‖L1
] [
γpiyref
γ∆αref
]

[
yref
αref
]
. (23)
Finally, we note the following inequality
abs(Φ)1  ‖Φ‖L11 (24)
from the fact that the L1 norm is selecting the maximum row sum. Therefore, we have
abs
([
Φyw
Φαw
])
w¯ + abs
([
Φyu Φyδ
Φαu Φαδ
]) [u¯
δ¯
]

[‖Φyw‖L11‖Φαw‖L11
]
w∞ + abs
([
Φyu Φyδ
Φαu Φαδ
]) [
γpiyref1
γ∆αref1
]

[‖Φyw‖L11‖Φαw‖L11
]
w∞ +
[‖Φyu‖L11 ‖Φyδ‖L11‖Φαu‖L11 ‖Φαδ‖L11
] [
γpiyref
γ∆αref
]

[
yref1
αref1
]
=
[
y¯
α¯
]
.
We can see that if the conditions of Lemma 1 hold, we can always construct a quadruplet (y¯, u¯, α¯, δ¯)
satisfying all the three conditions of Theorem 1. The converse is not true. Therefore, Theorem 1 can
be applied on a strictly larger class of problems than Lemma 1.
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Appendix B: cart pole model
We consider a cart-pole problem with η being the displacement of the cart and θ the angle of the pole.
The dynamics is given by
η¨ =
(4
3
(M +m)l −mlcos2(θ)
)−1
(
4
3
ml2θ˙2sin(θ)−mglsin(θ)cos(θ) + 4
3
lu)
θ¨ =
(4
3
(M +m)l −mlcos2(θ)
)−1
(−mlθ˙2sin(θ)cos(θ) + (M +m)gsin(θ)− cos(θ)u).
We use the default model parameters from stable baselines: g = 9.8, M = 1, m = 0.1, and l = 0.5.
Using Euler discretization, the nonlinear discrete time cart pole model is given by
η[t+ 1] = η[t] + τ η˙[t], η˙[t+ 1] = η˙[t] + τ η¨[t], θ[t+ 1] = θ[t] + τ θ˙[t], θ˙[t+ 1] = θ˙[t] + τ θ¨[t]
with sampling time τ = 0.02.
Linearized model for Experiment I (Section 5.1)
Define the state vector x =
[
η η˙ θ θ˙
]>
. The linearized cart-pole model around the origin is
given by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t], y[t] = x[t] +Dww[t]
with
A =

1 τ 0 0
0 1 −3mgτ4M+m 0
0 0 1 τ
0 0 3(M+m)gτ(4M+m)l 1
 , B =

0
4τ
4M+m
0
−3τ
(4M+m)l
 , Dw =
001
0
 . (27)
Note from Dw that we have an one dimensional perturbation on the pole angle measurement. The
requirement is to certify that the actual pole angle is within the user-specified limit, that is,
|x3[t]| ≤ xlim, ∀t ≥ 0. (28)
As explained in Section 5.1, these assumptions are made for the ease of illustrating the result. Our
method can work on much more general model with the form defined in Section 2.
Learned model for Experiment II (Section 5.2)
When the model equation is unknown in the first place, we can collect the data from the simulator
and fit the data to a model. Let x(i,j)[t] be the state vector x at time t for the i-th episode from the
j-th bootstrap sample, for j = 0, 1, . . . , 100. For the j-th bootstrap run, we solve the following least
square problem to obtain the system matrices A(j) and B(j):
minimize
A(j),B(j)
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
‖x(i,j)[t+ 1]−A(j)x(i,j)[t]−B(j)u(i,j)[t]‖22 (29)
with T = 30, x from the simulator, and u randomly generated. We then find a pair of non-negative
matrices ∆A and ∆B such that
|A(j) −A(0)|  ∆A, |B(j) −B(0)|  ∆B , for j = 1, · · · , 100 (30)
to over-approximate the modeling error of the nominal model (A(0), B(0)). The learned model used
by our experiment in Section 5.2 is then given by
x[t+ 1] = A(0)x[t] +B(0)u[t] + δ[t]
y[t] = x[t] +Dww[t]
α[t] =
[
I
0
]
x[t] +
[
0
I
]
u[t] =
[
x[t]
u[t]
]
|δ[t]|  [∆A ∆B ] |α[t]| = Γ∆|α[t]|,
where Γ∆ = [∆A ∆B ] is the non-negative matrix used in Algorithm 1.
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